The Convention has been broadly ratified and it is widely accepted as customary international law and, moreover, as a norm of jus cogens. 4 Genocide is an international crime that can be committed either by States or by individuals. 5 Article IX of the Convention gives jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide. 6 Article VI establishes that persons charged with genocide may be tried ''by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. '' 7 In fact, the crime of genocide is punishable under Articles 2, 4, and 6 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statutes, respectively. These articles repeat verbatim the definition of the crime of genocide provided by Article II of the Convention:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 5 Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 179. 6 The ICJ found that Serbia had neither committed, nor conspired to commit, nor incited the commission of genocide, in violation of its obligations under the Convention. However, the ICJ found that Serbia had violated the obligation to prevent genocide in respect of the genocide that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995. Ibidem, para 471. The ICJ also has, as a pending case, the application to institute proceedings against Yugoslavia submitted by Croatia on Any of those underlying acts constitute genocide when committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. In order to appreciate the commission of genocide, proof of the specific genocidal intent to destroy the targeted group in whole or in part is required in addition to proof of intent to commit the underlying act. 8 
The Mens Rea
Article II of the Convention defines genocide to mean any of certain ''acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such''. This intent (or mens rea) has been referred to as, for example, special intent, specific intent, dolus specialis, particular intent and genocidal intent. 9 This mens rea distinguishes the crime of genocide from crimes against humanity, in particular persecution and extermination. 10 Whether there was genocidal intent is assessed based upon ''all of the evidence, taken together''. 
Intent to Destroy the Targeted Group as Such
The words ''as such'' underscore that something more than discriminatory intent is required for genocide; there must be intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the protected group 12 ''as a separate and distinct entity''. 13 The ultimate victim of the crime of genocide is the group. 14 The term ''destroy'' in customary international law means physical or biological destruction and excludes attempts to annihilate cultural or sociological elements. 15 According to the ILC, the preparatory work for the Convention clearly shows ''that the destruction in question is the material destruction of a group, either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group''. 16 However, attacks on cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group often occur alongside physical and biological destruction and ''may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group''. 17 ''By its nature, intent is not usually susceptible to direct proof'' because ''only the accused himself has first-hand knowledge of his own mental state, and he is unlikely to testify to his own genocidal intent''. 18 In the absence of direct evidence, a perpetrator's genocidal intent may be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances that can lead beyond reasonable doubt to the existence of the intent, provided that it is the only reasonable inference that can be made from the totality of evidence. 19 Genocidal intent may be inferred from certain facts or indicia, including but not limited to: (a) the general context; (b) the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or by others; (c) the scale of the atrocities committed; (d) their general nature; (e) their execution in a region or a country; (f) the fact that the victims were deliberately and systematically chosen on account of their membership in a particular group; (g) the exclusion, in this regard, of members of other groups; (h) the political doctrine which gave rise to the acts referred to; (i) the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts 20 ; and (j) the perpetration of acts which violate the very foundation of the group or are considered as such by their perpetrators. 21 Further, proof of the mental state with respect to the commission of the underlying act can serve as evidence from which to draw the further inference that the accused possessed the specific intent to destroy.
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The existence of a personal motive must be distinguished from intent and does not preclude a finding of genocidal intent. 23 The reason why an accused sought to destroy the victim group ''has no bearing on guilt''. 24 Jurisprudence has held that ''the preparatory work of the Convention of 1948 brings out that premeditation was not selected as a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide'' and ''it ensues from this omission that the drafters of the Convention did not deem the existence of an organisation or a system serving genocidal objective as a legal ingredient of the crime''. 25 Hence, the ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence has made it clear that a plan or policy (e.g., a State policy) is not a statutory element of the crime of genocide. 26 Moreover, ''the offence of genocide, as defined in the Statute and in international customary law, does not require proof that the perpetrator of genocide participated in a widespread and systematic attack 22 Krstić Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 20. 23 Jelisić Appeal Judgment, supra n. 9, para 49. See also Niyitegeka, supra n. 12, paras 52-53; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, supra n. 18, para 161. See generally ICTY: Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (15 July 1999), paras 268-269, declaring that ''personal motives are generally irrelevant in criminal law''. 24 Stakić Appeal Judgment, supra n. 11, para 45. 25 Jelisić Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, para 100. 26 Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, supra n. 18, para 138; Jelisić Appeal Judgment, supra n. 9, para 48. against the civilian population''.
27 This is an important difference when compared to crimes against humanity.
International tribunals have noted that Article 6 of the ICC Statute, which defines genocide, does not prescribe the requirement of a ''manifest pattern'' introduced in the ICC Elements of Crimes. 28 They acknowledged that the language of the ICC Elements of Crimes, in requiring that acts of genocide must be committed in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct, implicitly excludes random or isolated acts of genocide. 29 However, ''reliance on the definition of genocide given in the ICC's Elements of Crimes is inapposite''. The Appeals Chamber further clarified that the ICC Elements of Crimes ''are not binding rules, but only auxiliary means of interpretation'' of the ICC Statute. Finally, it has been clearly established by jurisprudence that the requirement that the prohibited conduct be part of a widespread or systematic attack ''was not mandated by customary international law''. 30 However, the existence of a plan or policy can be an important factor in inferring genocidal intent. When the acts and conduct of an accused are carried out in accordance with an existing plan or policy to commit genocide they become evidence which is relevant to the accused's knowledge of the plan; such knowledge constitutes further evidence supporting an inference of intent. 
The Targeted Groups
Genocide was ''originally conceived as the destruction of a race, tribe, nation, or other group with a particular positive identity; not as the destruction of various people lacking a distinct identity''. 32 The Convention's definition of the group adopts the understanding that genocide is the destruction of distinct human groups with particular identities, such as ''persons of a common national origin'' or ''any religious community united by a single spiritual ideal''. 33 34 International jurisprudence accepts a combined subjective-objective approach for the identification of the targeted groups. An objective definition can be found, e.g., in Akayesu, supra n. 9, paras 512-515. A subjective approach (holding that the victim is perceived by the not the lack of them''. A negatively defined group-for example all ''non-Serbs'' in a particular region-thus does not meet the definition.
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The drafters of the Convention also devoted close attention to the positive identification of groups with specific distinguishing characteristics in deciding which groups they would include and which (such as political groups) they would exclude. The ICJ spoke to the same effect in 1951 in declaring as an object of the Convention the safeguarding of ''the very existence of certain human groups''. 36 Such an understanding of genocide requires a positive identification of the group. The rejection of proposals to include, within the Convention, political groups 37 and cultural genocide also demonstrates that the drafters were giving close attention to the positive identification of groups with specific distinguishing wellestablished characteristics. 
Substantiality of Part of the Targeted Group
To establish specific genocidal intent, it is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator intended to achieve the complete annihilation of a group throughout the world, 39 but, at least, to destroy a substantial part thereof. 40 Indeed, if a group is targeted ''in part'', the portion targeted must be a substantial part of the group 41 because it ''must be significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole''. 2004) , para 628. The ICTR, in Semanza, supra n. 40, para 316, held: ''Although there is no numeric threshold of victims necessary to establish genocide, the Prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy the group as such, in whole or in part. The intention to destroy must be, at least, to destroy a substantial part of the Group''. 42 Krstić Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 8. According to the ICJ: ''In the first place, the intent must be to destroy at least a substantial part of the particular group. That is demanded by the very nature of the crime of genocide: since the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole is to prevent the intentional destruction of groups, the part targeted must be significant enough to a have an impact on the group as a whole'' (Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 198).
The numeric size of the part of the group which is targeted, evaluated in absolute terms and relative to the overall group size, ''is the necessary and important starting point'' in assessing whether the part targeted is substantial enough, but is ''not in all cases the ending point of the inquiry''. Other considerations that are ''neither exhaustive nor dispositive'' include the prominence within the group of the targeted part, whether the targeted part of the group ''is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival'' and the area of the malefactors' activity and control and limitations on the possible extent of their reach. Which factors are applicable, and their relative weight, will vary depending on the circumstances of the case. 43 3 The Actus Reus
Killing Members of the Group
The ICTR has defined ''killing'' as ''homicide committed with intent to cause death''. 44 For the ICTY, the elements of killing are: the death of the victim, the causation of the death of the victim by the accused and the mens rea of the perpetrator. 45 Killing may occur where the death of the victim is caused by an omission as well as by an act of the accused or of one or more persons for whom the accused is criminally responsible. 46 Killing may be established where the accused's conduct contributes substantially to the death of the victim. 47 The mens rea for killing may take the form of an intention to kill, 48 or an intention to cause serious bodily harm which the accused should reasonably have known might lead to death. 49 To establish the death of the victim, the Prosecution need not prove that the body of the dead person has been recovered. It may instead establish a victim's death by circumstantial evidence, provided that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that the victim is dead. 50 
Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Group
Article II.b refers to an intentional act or omission that causes ''serious bodily or mental harm'' to members of the targeted group. Acts in Article II.b, similarly to Article II.a, require proof of a result. 51 This phrase may be construed to include ''harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses''. 52 The harm must go ''beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation'' and inflict ''grave and long-term disadvantage to a person's ability to lead a normal and constructive life''. 53 The harm need not be ''permanent and irremediable'' to meet the standard of constituting serious harm. 54 ''Serious mental harm'' entails more than minor or temporary impairment to mental faculties. 55 Moreover, ''to support a conviction for genocide, the bodily harm or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part.'' 56 The determination of what constitutes serious harm depends on the circumstances. 57 The harm must be inflicted intentionally to meet the mens rea requisite for the underlying offence. 58 Examples of acts causing serious bodily or mental harm include ''torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes disfigurement or serious injury to members of the targeted national, ethnical, racial, or religious group''. 59 The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that forcible transfer ''does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act''. 60 However, in some circumstances a forcible transfer can be an underlying act that causes serious bodily or mental harm, in particular if the forcible transfer operation was attended by such circumstances as to lead to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population. Article II.c covers methods of destruction that ''do not immediately kill the members of the group, but, which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction''. 62 The methods of destruction covered by Article II.c are those seeking a group's physical or biological destruction. 63 In contrast to the underlying acts in Articles II.a and II.b, which require proof of a result, this provision does not require proof that a result was attained. 64 Examples of methods of destruction frequently mentioned in ICTR Trial Judgements include denying medical services and ''the creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion''. 65 For the ICTY, the conditions are: ''cruel or inhuman treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, and sexual violence; inhumane living conditions, namely failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities; and forced labour''. 66 ''Systematic expulsion from homes'' has also been cited as a potential means of inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about destruction. 67 Absent direct evidence of whether ''conditions of life'' imposed on the targeted group were calculated to bring about its physical destruction, Trial Chambers have ''focused on the objective probability of these conditions leading to the physical destruction of the group in part'' and assessed factors like the nature of the conditions imposed, the length of time that members of the group were subjected to them and characteristics of the targeted group like vulnerability. 68 The mens rea standard for the underlying offence of ''deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part'' is explicitly specified by the adjective ''deliberately''. 69 
Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births Within the Group
Trial Judgements have held that measures intended to prevent births should be construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes, and the prohibition of marriages. In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group. Further, measures intended to prevent births within the group may be physical, but can also be mental. 70 To amount to a genocidal act, the evidence must establish that the acts were carried out with intent to prevent births within the group and ultimately to destroy the group as such, in whole or in part. With respect to forcibly transferring children of the group to another group, the Trial Chambers have speculated that, as in the case of measures intended to prevent births, the objective is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another. 72 The ICC Elements of Crimes specify that the person or persons transferred must be under the age of 18 years.
Final Considerations
During the first half century after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, no international tribunal decided a case of genocide. During those years, genocide was, at best, a crime reserved for domestic tribunals, as was the case in Eichmann Jerusalem District Court Judgement. However, in the last twelve years three international tribunals (ICTR, ICTY and ICJ) have dealt in extensive detail with genocide, the crime of crimes, establishing a well-settled jurisprudence on its different constituent elements. It seems worth noting that the Achilles' heel of this jurisprudence concerns the definition of the last two types of the actus reus of the crime of genocide, where international jurisprudence is highly speculative as there has been no single case of these types. 71 Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, paras 355-356, 361. In response to the Applicant's claims, including that ''forced separation of male and female Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as systematically practiced when various municipalities were occupied by the Serb forces (…) in all probability entailed a decline in birth rate of the group, given the lack of physical contact over many months'', and that ''rape and sexual violence against women led to physical trauma which interfered with victims' reproductive functions and in some cases resulted in infertility'', the ICJ found that no evidence was provided as to ''enable it to conclude that Bosnian Serb forces committed acts which could be qualified as imposing measures to prevent births in the protected group within the meaning of Article II(d) of the Convention''. 72 Akayesu, supra n. 9, para 509. See Fernandez-Pacheco 2011, pp. 76-77.
